Independence-the study of what is relevant to a given problem of reasoning-is an important AI topic. In this paper, we investigate several notions of conditional independence in propositional logic: Darwiche and Pearl's conditional independence, and some more restricted forms of it. Many characterizations and properties of these independence relations are provided. We show them related to many other notions of independence pointed out so far in the literature (mainly formula-variable independence, irrelevance and novelty under various forms, separability, interactivity). We identify the computational complexity of conditional independence and of all these related independence relations.
Introduction

Motivations
Focusing on what is relevant is a natural approach to design efficient knowledge-based engines. Indeed, as a preliminary step to various intelligent tasks (e.g., planning, decision making, reasoning), it is reasonable to discard everything but what is relevant. For instance, I do not need to remember the date of birth of Arthur Rimbaud when my objective is to cook noodles. The idea of focusing on what is relevant is strongly related to many AI notions, like local computation and micro-theories [16] . Irrelevance is also a central topic in probabilistic reasoning [29] . Furthermore, the complementary notion of relevance is a key notion for defining information filtering policies [13] , and cooperative answering techniques [6] . For instance, when a database user is unable to express her queries in a formal way, an approach consists in determining her topics of interest, then to return in a structured way all what the database tells about such topics. Obviously, relevance relations are needed to characterize precisely what "tells about" means. This explains why (ir)relevance, under various names as independence, irredundancy, influenceability, novelty, separability, and interactivity is nowadays considered as an important notion in many AI fields [1, 15, 24, 32] .
In the following, relevance is captured by relations in the metalanguage of propositional logic. Arguments of such relations are propositional formulas encoding knowledge bases and pieces of knowledge (including queries), and sets of propositional variables or literals that represent, for instance, subject matters or topics of interest.
To what extent is the goal of improving inference reachable through (ir)relevance? To address this point, a key issue is computational complexity. Indeed, assume that we know that the resolution of some reasoning problems can be speeded up once some relevance information has been elicited. In the situation where it is computationally harder to point out such information from the input than to reason directly from it, computational benefits are hard to be expected. If so, alternative uses of relevance for reasoning are to be investigated. For instance, searching for relevance information can be limited by considering only those pieces of knowledge that can be generated in a tractable way. In the case where such information depend only on the knowledge base, another approach consists in (tentatively) compensating the computational resources spent in deriving the relevance information through many queries (computing the relevance information can then be viewed as a form of compilation). Clearly enough, the computational issue is also central when relevance relations are not used to improve inference but for other purposes, like defining information filtering policies or designing cooperative answering approaches. Thus, a cooperative answering approach relying on a highly intractable relevance relation could hardly be used on large instances.
Unfortunately, little is known about the computational complexity of relevance. This paper, together with a companion paper [20] , contributes to fill this gap. The complexity of various logic-based relevance relations is identified in a propositional setting. By logicbased we mean that the notions of relevance we focus on are not extra-logical but built inside the logic: they are defined using the standard logical notions of (classical) formula, model, logical deduction, etc.
Scope and organization of the paper
In the companion paper [20] , several forms of relevance bearing between a piece of information (a propositional formula) and a set of literals or variables have been investigated (some of these notions are briefly recalled in Section 2). Here, we consider conditional independence, introduced as a logical counterpart to probabilistic independence in [7, 8] . Intuitively, two sets of variables X and Y are conditionally independent given a set of variables Z and a formula Σ if and only if, whichever full information about Z we consider, the addition of information about X in Σ does not enable us telling anything new about Y . Darwiche [8] intensively shows how the exploitation of conditional independence can prove computationally valuable for several forms of inference (including deduction, abduction, and diagnosis). Basically, through the exploitation of conditional independence, a global computation can be replaced by a number of efficient, local computations.
According to Darwiche [8] , there are two main positions in the literature with respect to irrelevance: (1) a "philosophical" position where we start with some intuitive properties of independence, and some independence relations satisfying these properties are then exhibited, and (2) a "pragmatic" position where independence is not an absolute notion but a task-specific one and its utility is measured at the light of the improvement it offers when taken into account.
In this paper, we adhere to both positions. We first focus on Darwiche's conditional independence. We complete the investigation reported in [8] by showing close connections with probabilistic independence (the philosophical side), by identifying the computational complexity of conditional independence and by suggesting additional applications in the context of reasoning about actions (the practical side). In addition, we introduce a useful restriction of conditional independence, namely strong conditional independence. For this restriction, any conjunctive information (not necessarily complete) about Z is acceptable. From the philosophical side, we present several semantical characterizations of strong conditional independence and some of its metatheoretic properties. Especially, we show that strong conditional independence satisfies all graphoid axioms. From the practical side, we identify the computational complexity of strong conditional independence in the general case and in some restricted ones. Then, we successively consider several forms of (ir)relevance already pointed out so far in the literature, and show them closely connected to conditional independence: formula-variable independence [20] , strict relevance, explanatory relevance, relevance between two subject matters [19] , novelty under various forms (positive and negative, novelty-based independence) [14, 26] , separability [23] , causal independence [9] , and interactivity [4] . As additional results, we identify the complexity of all these independence relations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Some formal preliminaries are given in Section 2. Conditional independence relations and some metatheoretic properties are presented in Section 3. Complexity results are reported in Section 4. Close connections of both notions of conditional independence with existing irrelevance relations are exhibited in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
Preliminaries
Propositional logic
Let PS be a finite set of propositional variables. PROP PS is the propositional language built up from PS, the connectives, and the Boolean constants true and false in the usual way. For every X ⊆ PS, PROP X denotes the sublanguage of PROP PS generated from the variables of X only. A literal of PROP X is either a variable of X (positive literal) or the negation of a variable of X (negative literal). A clause δ (respectively a term γ ) of PROP X is a (possibly empty) disjunction (respectively conjunction) of literals of PROP X . Often clauses and terms are considered as the sets of their literals. A CNF (respectively a DNF) formula of PROP X is a conjunction of clauses (respectively a disjunction of terms) of PROP X .
From now on, Σ denotes a propositional formula, i.e., a member of PROP PS . Var(Σ) is the set of propositional variables appearing in Σ. Elements of PS are denoted x, y, etc. Subsets of PS are denoted X, Y , etc. In order to simplify notations, we will assimilate every singleton X = {x} with its unique element x. The size |Σ| of a propositional formula Σ is the number of symbols used to write it.
Formulas of PROP PS are interpreted in the usual way. Especially, every finite set of formulas is identified with the conjunction of its elements. Full instantiations of variables of X ⊆ PS are called X-worlds and denoted by ω X ; their set is noted Ω X . Every X-world ω X will be identified with the term containing x as a literal when x is interpreted as true in ω X , and ¬x when x is false in ω X for every x ∈ X. Equivalently, ω X will also be identified with the (conjunctively-interpreted) set of these literals. Whenever ω X is an X-world and ω Y is a Y -world s.t. X ∩ Y = ∅, (ω X , ω Y ) denotes the X ∪ Y -world which coincides with ω X on X and with ω Y on Y . In order to simplify notations, we assume that every ω X represents an X-world (even when ω X ∈ Ω X is not stated explicitly). PS-worlds are the usual interpretations over PS; their set is noted Ω. When Σ is true in an interpretation ω, ω is a model of Σ. When Σ has a model, it is said to be consistent or satisfiable; otherwise, it is said to be inconsistent, contradictory, or unsatisfiable. When every interpretation of Ω is a model of Σ, Σ is said to be valid, or a tautology. As usual, |= denotes classical entailment, and ≡ denotes logical equivalence. ω X is a partial model of Σ whenever there exists a model of Σ that coincides with ω X on X; stated otherwise, ω X is a partial model of Σ whenever ω X ∧ Σ is consistent (here, ω X is viewed as a term).
Given a set of interpretations S ⊆ Ω, we denote for(S) a formula that has S as a set of models. Of course, there are many equivalent formulas having S as models, but for will be used only when this does not matter. When S = {ω}, i.e., S is composed of a single interpretation, we write for(ω) instead of for({ω}). Conversely, given a formula Σ, we denote Mod(Σ) the set of models of Σ.
In this paper we use the concepts of implicates and prime implicates.
Definition 1.
The set of implicates of a formula Σ, denoted by IS(Σ), is defined as:
The set of prime implicates of a formula Σ, denoted by IP(Σ), is defined as:
It is well known that a clause δ is a logical consequence of a formula Σ if and only if it is entailed by at least one prime implicate π of Σ. This can be checked efficiently since a clause δ is a logical consequence of a clause π if and only if δ is a tautology or every literal of π is a literal of δ. Accordingly, the prime implicates form of Σ can be considered as a compilation of Σ [30] .
Implicants and prime implicants will also be considered in the following.
Definition 2.
The set of implicants of a formula Σ, denoted by SI(Σ), is defined as:
The set of prime implicants of a formula Σ, denoted by PI(Σ), is defined as:
Often, we will not be interested in all prime implicants (respectively prime implicates) of Σ but only in the subset IP X (Σ) (respectively PI X (Σ)) containing those built up from variables of X, only.
Of course, the set of implicants/ates, prime implicants/ates may contain equivalent terms/clauses. We can restrict our attention to one term/clause for each set of equivalent terms/clauses. Stated otherwise, in both IP(Σ), PI(Σ), IP X (Σ), PI X (Σ), only one representative per equivalence class is kept.
Formula-variable independence and forgetting
Let us first recall the definitions and results about formula-variable independence and variable forgetting [20] needed in this paper.
Let Σ be a formula from PROP PS and X be a subset of PS. Σ is semantically Vindependent from X if and only if there exists a formula Φ s.t. Φ ≡ Σ holds and Φ is syntactically V-independent from X, i.e., Var(Φ) ∩ X = ∅. When X is a singleton {x} we say that Σ is V-independent from x (instead of {x}). It can be easily shown [20] that Σ is (semantically) V-independent from X if and only if Σ is V-independent from each variable of X. The set of variables on which a formula Σ depends is denoted by DepVar(Σ).
For instance, Σ = (a ∧ (b ∨ ¬b)) is V-dependent on a and V-independent from b, and DepVar(Σ) = {a}.
For every formula Σ and every variable x, Σ x←0 (respectively Σ x←1 ) is the formula obtained by replacing every occurrence of x in Σ by the constant false (respectively true). The next four statements are equivalent [20] :
Variable independence can be determined in an efficient way when Σ is given in some specific normal forms, namely its prime implicates form or its prime implicants form. For such normal forms, V-independence comes down to its syntactical form. Namely, the next statements are equivalent [20] :
The problem of determining whether Σ is V-independent from X is coNP-complete [20] .
A basic way to render a formula Σ V-independent from a given set X of variables consists in forgetting X in Σ.
Let Σ be a formula from PROP PS and let X be a subset of PS. ForgetVar(Σ, X) is the formula inductively defined as follows:
As a direct consequence of the definition, ForgetVar(Σ, {x 1 , . . . , x n }) is equivalent to the quantified Boolean formula (usually with free variables!) noted ∃x 1 . . . ∃x n Σ.
It can be shown that ForgetVar(Σ, X) is the logically strongest consequence of Σ that is V-independent from X (up to logical equivalence). Thus, if a formula ϕ is V-independent from X, then Σ |= ϕ if and only if ForgetVar(Σ, X) |= ϕ. Accordingly, Σ is V-independent from X if and only if Σ ≡ ForgetVar(Σ, X) holds.
It turns out that forgetting is a fundamental operation for many AI tasks [20, 21, 25] .
Computational complexity
The complexity results we give in this paper refer to some complexity classes which deserve some recalls. More about them can be found in Papadimitriou's textbook [28] . Given a problem A, we denote by A the complementary problem of A. We assume that the classes P, NP and coNP are known to the reader. The following classes will also be considered: [31] which plays a prominent role in knowledge representation and reasoning.
Conditional independence
Conditional independence can be seen as a generalization of formula-variable independence. Given three sets of propositional variables X, Y and Z, and a propositional formula Σ, we want to express the fact that, given Σ and some knowledge about Z, the truth value of the variables in X may affect the truth value of variables in Y (and vice versa).
Simple conditional independence
Darwiche and Pearl's conditional independence [8, 9] (often referred as "simple conditional independence" or "conditional independence" in the following) is defined as follows:
Definition 3 (conditional independence). Let Σ be a propositional formula and X, Y, Z be disjoint subsets of PS. X and Y are independent given Z with respect to Σ (denoted
We have the following: 
and the set of {a, b, c, d}-worlds that are consistent with Σ (in other terms, the models of Σ) is
it can be checked that for each ω 1 ∈ S 1 and each ω 2 ∈ S 2 such that ω 1 and ω 2 give the same truth values to a and b, then ω 1 ∧ ω 2 ∈ S 3 .
As explained by Darwiche and Pearl [9] , X ∼ Z Σ Y holds if and only if for any possible full information about Z, adding some information about Y does not tell us anything new about X. Intuitively, if in the context ω Z , adding ω X gives some information about Y , then some partial models of Σ over Y , i.e., those in contrast with the new information obtained on Y , should not remain partial models any longer. As a result, X and Y are independent if, for any "consistent" choice (with Σ) of ω X , ω Y , and ω Z , the formula
Clearly enough, conditional independence given Z with respect to Σ satisfies the following properties [8] :
Proof. (1) and (2) Darwiche showed [8] that conditional independence satisfies all semi-graphoid axioms, which are considered reasonable postulates for conditional independence relations. We recall here these axioms, more so because we will need them further on. Let Ind(X, Z, Y ) be an independence relation between X and Y given Z (where X, Y and Z are pairwise disjoint sets of variables).
The graphoid axioms are composed by all the above ones plus the following one.
Simple conditional independence does not satisfy Intersection. Indeed, let
¬y ∧ ¬w ∧ z ∧ Σ and ¬x ∧ z ∧ Σ are both consistent while ¬x ∧ ¬y ∧ ¬w ∧ z ∧ Σ is inconsistent. Hence x ∼ {z} Σ {y, w}, while x ∼ {z,w} Σ y and x ∼ {z,y} Σ w both hold. Hereafter, we complete Darwiche's characterization of conditional independence by establishing a clear link between simple conditional independence and probabilistic independence. This shows that there is more than an analogy between these notions but a concrete mathematical connection. Definition 6. Let pr be a probability distribution on Ω, and X, Y, Z ⊆ PS.
• X and Y are independent given Z according to pr, denoted by X ∼ Z pr Y , if and only if
• pr is strictly compatible with a propositional formula Σ if and only if ∀ω ∈ Ω, ω |= Σ is equivalent to pr(ω) > 0.
Proposition 2. X ∼ Z Σ Y if and only if there is a probability distribution pr strictly compatible with
Let us define the probability distribution pr by:
First, pr is a probability distribution:
It is obvious that pr is strictly compatible with Σ.
Lastly, let us check that [12] , can be mapped easily into a conditional independence problem.
Conditional independence may also be helpful for computing ramifications of an action: if Dep(a) is the set of variables that are directly influenced by action a (i.e., appearing in its effects), and if Σ is the set of static laws (or integrity constraints), then any variable y such that Dep(a) ∼ ∅ Σ y is guaranteed to be "ramification-free" (the converse, however, is not true).
Altogether, this explains why conditional independence is an important notion and motivates the investigation of its computational complexity.
Strong conditional independence
Simple conditional independence does not apply to contexts where the new information that can be learned about Z is incomplete, i.e., the truth value of some variables of Z is not available, or, more generally, many partial (and possibly mutually exclusive) Z-worlds are possible. For instance, if Z represents a set of possibly measurable variables, associated to a set of sensors (one for each z ∈ Z), it can be the case that some measurements fail, i.e., the value of z is not always available.
The following notion, strong conditional independence, strengthens Darwiche and Pearl's conditional independence by taking into account the case in which the information about Z is any conjunctive information, i.e., any term of PROP Z . Namely, X and Y are strongly independent given Z with respect to Σ if and only if, whichever conjunctive information (i.e., a set of facts) we may learn about Z, then the addition of information about Y does not enable one to tell anything new about X.
Definition 7 (strong conditional independence).
Let Σ be a propositional formula and X, Y, Z be disjoint subsets of PS. X and Y are strongly independent given Z with respect to
Strong conditional independence has the same metatheoretic properties as conditional independence, plus the preservation by contraction of Z (which is a trivial consequence of the definition).
Marginal strong conditional independence obviously coincides with marginal conditional independence. Ceteris paribus strong conditional independence is defined by im-
Since the set of all possible choices for γ Z corresponds to the set of all partial assignments of the variables of Z, we get:
Proof. Comes straightforwardly from the fact that each term γ Z can be uniquely identified with a Z -world ω Z for some Z ⊆ Z and conversely. ✷
The converse generally does not hold since conditional independence is not stable by contraction of Z. Indeed, stepping back to the previous example, we have c ∼
The following results characterize strongly conditionally independent sets of variables. They both express that X ≈ Z Σ Y holds if and only if any set of simple facts (i.e., literals) we may learn about Z never enables one to deduce a nontrivial disjunctive information involving both X and Y .
Proposition 4 (consequence decomposability). X ≈ Z Σ Y if and only if, for any term γ Z of PROP Z , and ∀ϕ
γ Z can be identified with a unique Z -world ω Z for a unique subset Z of Z. We now have to prove that
The following property expresses strong conditional independence in terms of prime implicates. Indeed, if a formula Σ is expressed as its set of prime implicates, checking strong conditional independence with respect to Σ can be done by checking whether there are clauses that contain both variables from X and from Y .
Proposition 5. X ≈ Z Σ Y if and only if no δ ∈ IP X∪Y ∪Z (Σ) includes both a variable of X and a variable of Y .
Proof. (⇒) Suppose that
Thus, if δ contains both a variable from X and a variable from Y , i.e., δ X and δ Y are not empty, then δ is not minimal among the clauses of PROP X∪Y ∪Z entailed by Σ and thus it is not in
, and because the propositional formula ϕ X is equivalent to the conjunction of its prime implicates, there is a prime implicate
is a prime implicate δ of Σ s.t. δ is a subclause of δ X ∨ δ Y ∨ δ Z . If δ were a subclause of δ X ∨ δ Z it would be the case that Σ |= δ X ∨ δ Z , which is not possible; and similarly for δ Y ∨ δ Z . Thus δ contains at least a variable of X and a variable of Y . ✷ As a consequence of Proposition 5, strong conditional independence can be reduced to the problem of checking strong conditional independence in the case in which both X and Y are composed of a single variable.
the characterization given by Proposition 5 can be rewritten this way: X ≈ Z Σ Y if and only if ∀δ ∈ IP {x}∪{y}∪(Z∪(X\{x})∪(Y \{y})) (Σ), δ does not mention both x and y, which, using again Proposition 5, means that x ≈
mentioning both an x i ∈ X and a y j ∈ Y ; then, using again identity ( * ), we get δ ∈ IP Z∪(X\{x i })∪(Y \{y j }) (Σ), which, using According to Proposition 5, x ≈ Z Σ y holds if and only if there is a prime implicate δ in IP Z∪{x,y} (Σ) mentioning both x and y. This is equivalent to saying that there is a prime implicant γ in PI Z∪{x} (Σ ⇒ y) or in PI Z∪{x} (Σ ⇒ ¬y), consistent with Σ and mentioning x. The consistency condition is necessary; indeed, let us consider Σ = {c ⇒ a, d ⇒ b} and Z = {c, d}; PI Z∪{a} (Σ ⇒ b) = {c ∧ ¬a, d} mentions a but nevertheless a ≈ {c,d} Σ b holds; this is because c ∧ ¬a is not consistent with Σ or, in other words, c ∧ ¬a is a prime implicant of Σ ⇒ b only because it is a prime implicant of ¬Σ. Thus, the set of prime implicants of interest is PI Z∪{x} (y) filtered by removing those containing a prime implicant of ¬Σ, which corresponds exactly to the set of minimal abductive explanations for y with respect to Σ, where the set of possible individual hypotheses is the set of literals built up from Z ∪ {x} [11] . Equivalently, this set is the label of y according to the ATMS literature [30] . This leads to the following characterization:
y if and only if both PI
Z∪{x} Σ (y) and PI
Z∪{x} Σ (¬y) are V-independent from x.
We first prove the following lemma:
Proof. (⇒) Assume that x ≈ Z Σ y; from Proposition 5, we know that there is a prime implicate δ ∈ IP Z∪{x,y} (Σ) mentioning x and y. Without loss of generality, let δ ≡ x ∨ y ∨ δ Z where δ Z ∈ PROP Z . Let γ ≡ ¬x ∧ ¬δ Z .
• if γ ∧Σ were inconsistent, then Σ ∧¬x ∧¬δ Z would be inconsistent, i.e., Σ |= δ Z ∨x; thus, δ Z ∨ x ∨ y would not be a prime implicate of Σ (because it would not be minimal). Thus, γ ∧ Σ is consistent;
• if there were a γ |= γ s.t. γ |= γ and γ ∧ Σ |= y, then we would have Σ |= y ∨ ¬γ with y ∨ ¬γ |= δ and δ |= y ∨ ¬γ thus δ would not be in
(⇐) Assume, without loss of generality, that ∃γ ∈ PI Z∪{x} (Σ ⇒ y) s.t. γ mentions x and y and γ ∧ Σ is consistent; again without loss of generality, assume that γ has the form (¬y) mention x or, equivalently, they are V-independent from x. ✷ In other words, x ≈ Z Σ y if and only if both x and ¬x are irrelevant hypotheses for (minimally) explaining y and ¬y, i.e., neither x nor ¬x participates in any minimal explanation of y and neither x nor ¬x participates in any minimal explanation of ¬y [11] .
This gives us an algorithm for computing strong independence relations using a basic ATMS (or an algorithm for computing abductive explanations). Let Another interesting feature of strong conditional independence is that it satisfies all graphoid axioms (including intersection, unlike simple conditional independence): 
hence there cannot exist a prime implicate of Σ over X ∪ Y ∪ Z ∪ W mentioning both a variable from X and a variable from Y , which (by Proposition 5) means that
. (1) and (2) 
This confirms the particular interest of strong conditional independence, which not only can be nicely characterized by means of prime implicates (in contrast to simple conditional independence), but also satisfies all graphoid axioms. Furthermore, in Section 5 we show that strong conditional independence is closely related to other notions such as relevance or novelty.
We can define a last notion of conditional independence, stronger than the two previous ones, that we call perfect conditional independence. While the definition of strong independence takes into account information over the variables Z that is represented as terms (conjunction of literals), here we remove this assumption, and consider the case in which any information may be available, that is, any possible propositional formula. Namely, X and Y are perfectly independent given Z with respect to Σ if and only if whichever information, i.e., any formula, we may learn about Z, then the addition of information about Y does not enable one to tell anything new about X. This intuitively means that no significant relationship between X and Y can be inferred when learning any information, including disjunctive information, about Z.
As an illustration, let Z = {n(orth), s(outh), e(ast), w(est)} and Z = {ne, nw, se, sw} where Σ contains s ⇔ (se ∨ sw), e ⇔ (ne ∨ se), etc. and mutual exclusivity statements between ne, nw, se and sw (such as sw ⇒ ¬se, etc.). Z and Z define each other, because Σ entails ne ⇔ (n ∧ e), etc. Let us now add to Σ the two formulas se ⇒ rain and sw ⇒ wind, which imply s ⇒ (rain ∨ wind). Then rain and wind are strongly independent given Z with respect to Σ while they are not given Z. In both cases, perfect independence between rain and wind does not hold. This is because we may later discover that the variables se and sw can be redefined in terms of the variables s, e, and w: in this new representation, there is a clear link between wind and rain.
This example shows that the lack of perfect independence between X and Y corresponds intuitively to a potential dependence given the topic corresponding to Z.
However, perfect conditional independence is an extremely strong notion and is more of theoretical interest than of practical use, therefore we do not devote much space to it. It can be shown that perfect independence is less sensitive to the granularity of the representation than the two weaker forms of independence, and that it satisfies all graphoid axioms except (WU). The interested reader may read a longer version of our article, accessible by anonymous ftp at ftp://ftp.irit.fr/pub/IRIT/RPDMP/CIPL.ps.gz. This long version not only contains a detailed study of perfect independence, but also a study of how conditional independence extends when we relax the assumption that the sets of variables X, Y and Z are disjoint.
Complexity results
We investigate now computational complexity issues. We start by analyzing in depth the complexity of simple conditional independence. We consider a number of restrictions on X, Y , Z and Σ which may lower the complexity level, namely: |X| = 1 and/or |Y | = 1 (checking whether a variable is independent from a variable / a set of variables),
Note that, for twofold partition independence, the distinctions on Z are irrelevant; therefore, all three problems of the last row of Table 1 are identical.
Simple conditional independence
Proposition 9 (complexity of conditional independence). The results are synthesized in Table 1 . Table 1 Complexity of conditional independence
The numerous results contained in Proposition 9 are proved in the following order, which tries to minimize the number of proofs: 
Hence, CONDITIONAL INDEPENDENCE belongs to 
in which c and x are new variables appearing nowhere else. F is obviously a polynomial transformation. In order to prove that it reduces 2-QBF to MIVSV, we first note that ∀ω X ∈ Ω X , ω X ∧ Σ is satisfiable (because assigning c to false satisfies Σ whatever the rest of the assignment) and that is unsatisfiable (ω X is obtained from the assignment over a 1 , . . . , a n adding x = false) and therefore s.t. ω X ∧ Σ |= ¬c; hence X and Y = {c} are not marginally independent. ✷ Lemmas 2 and 3 together enable us to prove the p 2 -completeness of the four problems located at the left-up corner of Table 1 .
We let V stands for Var(Σ) in the following lemmata. Table 1 .
Proof. Let us abbreviate this problem by CPI. Let Σ, V , X, Y be a positive instance of CPI. We show that the complementary problem CPI belongs to NP using the following nondeterministic algorithm:
Hence CPI is in NP and therefore CPI is in coNP. ✷
We turn now into the problem of twofold partition independence, which consists in checking whether X ∼ ∅ Σ Y holds, where X ∪ Y = V . Note that when X ∪ Y = V (i.e., the fourth line of Table 1 ), we know that Z = ∅ so that the distinctions on Z (the columns) are irrelevant. This comes down to saying that twofold partition independence is both a subproblem of marginal independence and of ceteris paribus independence.
Lemma 6. TWOFOLD PARTITION INDEPENDENCE is coNP-hard.
Proof. We consider the following polynomial reduction H : if ϕ is a propositional formula then H (ϕ) = X, V , Σ where
H is a polynomial reduction. Now, it is easy to see that X ∼ 
Lemma 7. CETERIBUS PARIBUS INDEPENDENCE OF SINGLE VARIABLES is coNP-hard.
Proof. Let ϕ be a formula. We prove that ϕ is unsatisfiable if and only if X and Y are ceteris paribus independent with respect to Σ, where X = {x}, Y = {y}, s.t. x and y do not appear in ϕ,
Then it can be easily verified that x and y are ceteris paribus independent with respect to Σ if and only if ϕ is unsatisfiable: As a result, only one result of Table 1 is left to be proven, namely marginal independence of single variables.
•
Proof. Membership comes from the fact that x ∼ ∅ Σ y if and only if (i) x ∧ Σ satisfiable and y ∧ Σ satisfiable imply that x ∧ y ∧ Σ satisfiable; (ii) idem with ¬x instead of x; (iii) idem with ¬y; (iv) idem with ¬x and ¬y. Now, for instance, (i) does not hold if and only if x ∧ Σ and y ∧ Σ are both satisfiable and x ∧ y ∧ Σ is not satisfiable, which proves that (i) considered as an individual problem-and also (ii) to (iv)-is in coBH 2 .
As to hardness, let us exhibit a polynomial reduction from SAT-OR-UNSAT to MARGINAL VARIABLE INDEPENDENCE. We define J ( ϕ, ψ ) = x, y, Σ where: 
Strong conditional independence
We now turn to the corresponding results concerning strong conditional independence. Note that the case Z = ∅ is useless to study because when Z = ∅, strong and (simple) conditional independence coincide. A fortiori, the case X ∪ Y = V , which entails Z = ∅, is useless as well. Table 2 .
Proposition 10. The complexity results of strong independence are reported in
Proof. It is sufficient to prove the two following lemmata: Table 2 Complexity of strong conditional independence 2 is shown by the following nondeterministic algorithm using an NP-oracle:
Proof. Membership of the complementary problem to
Note that p 2 -hardness of this case (that we do not actually have to prove since the following lemma will imply it) is a corollary of 
Lemma 10. CETERIS PARIBUS STRONG CONDITIONAL INDEPENDENCE OF SINGLE VARIABLES is
Proof. We exhibit a polynomial reduction from 2-QBF to CETERIS PARIBUS STRONG CONDITIONAL INDEPENDENCE OF SINGLE VARIABLES. Let Φ be a propositional formula over the alphabet {a 1 , . . . , a n , b 1 , . . . , b p }; let K( {a 1 , . . . , a n }, {b 1 , . . . , b p }, Φ ) = Σ, X, Y where
Let A = {a 1 , . . . a n }, B = {b 1 , . . . , b p } and Z = Var(Σ) \ ({x, y}) = A ∪ B. We note ω x , ω y instead of ω {x} , ω {y} . We use the notation C(ω x , ω y , γ Z Case 4:
i.e., to
and is consistent if and only if one of the disjuncts is consistent, i.e., at least one of these three conditions holds:
Condition (iii) is equivalent to the consistency of Φ ∧ γ A , because x and y do not appear in Φ. Now, Σ ∧ ω x ∧ γ A is consistent if and only if ω x = x is consistent or y ∧ ¬b [11] . More interestingly, the abductive characterization (Proposition 15) of strong conditional independence enables us to take advantage of some restrictions (especially restricting Σ to a set of Horn clauses) for which the computational complexity of checking irrelevance for minimal explanation falls down to the first level of the polynomial hierarchy, carrying with it the complexity of strong conditional independence. Considering DNF formulas is another restriction that makes the complexity of STRONG CONDITIONAL INDEPENDENCE falling down to the first level of the polynomial hierarchy. To be more precise:
Proof. From Proposition 6 it follows that it suffices to consider the case where both X and Y are singletons, i.e., X = {x} and Y = {y}. Let us consider the complementary problem of checking whether x is not strongly conditionally independent from y given Z with respect to Σ and let us prove it NP-complete. As an easy consequence of Proposition 7, x is not strongly conditionally independent from y given Z with respect to Σ if and only if there exists a prime implicate of Σ built up from Z ∪ {x, y} that contains both x and y.
• Membership. Guess a clause δ and check (1) that it contains both x and y, (2) that it does not contain any variable outside Z ∪ {x, y}, (3) that it contains a literal from each any consistent term from the given DNF of Σ, and (4) that any proper subclause of δ violates (3). Since (2), (3), (4) can be checked in time polynomial in the size of the input, this algorithm runs in nondeterministic polynomial time.
• Hardness. 
Independence, relevance, novelty, separability and non-interactivity
In this section, we show how conditional independence is related to many other forms of independence pointed out so far in the literature.
Formula-variable independence
As evoked before, conditional independence can be viewed as a generalization of formula-variable independence. Formally, we can reduce the problem of checking formulavariable independence to the problem of checking strong conditional independence.
Proposition 12. Let new be a variable of (PS \ Var(Σ)) \ X. Then Σ is V-independent from X if and only if X ≈
Var(Σ)\X
Σ⇔new new.
Proof. Let Z = Var(Σ) \ X. Let us first remark that since
the following equivalence holds: γ ∈ PI(Σ ⇔ new) if and only if:
Let us now prove Proposition 12: (⇒) If X ≈
Var(Σ)\X
Σ⇔new new then, due to Proposition 5, there is a γ ∈ PI(Σ ⇔ new) mentioning both new and some x ∈ X. Using the above equivalence, either (1) 
In case (1), there is a γ 1 ∈ PI(Σ) mentioning x ∈ X and thus Σ is V-dependent on X. In case (2), there is a γ 2 ∈ PI(¬Σ) mentioning x ∈ X, thus we have again ¬Σ is V-dependent on X, or equivalently, Σ is V-dependent on X.
(⇐) If Σ is V-dependent on X then there is a γ ∈ PI(Σ) mentioning some x ∈ X [20] . Now, let γ = new ∧ γ . Using the above equivalence, γ ∈ PI(Σ ⇔ new). Furthermore, γ mentions both an x ∈ X and new, so, due to Proposition 5, we have X ≈
Σ⇔new new. ✷ This result means that, in any state of knowledge regarding Var(Σ) \ X, knowing the truth values of variables in X cannot help us knowing the truth value of new and hence of Σ. The converse, i.e., expressing strong conditional independence from formulavariable independence, is possible as well (see Proposition 7). However, the exhibited transformation is not a polynomial one and thus will not be helpful when investigating computational complexity issues.
Conditional independence is also related to formula-variable independence through the notion of variable forgetting [20, 21, 25] . Especially, as a direct consequence of Theorem 5 in [8] 
As an illustration, let us consider Example 1 again. We have
We have seen that c ∼ {a} Σ d. This can be explained by the fact that ω {c} = {¬c}, ω {d} = {¬d} and ω {a} = {a} are such that
is equivalent to a.
Relevance
Lakemeyer [18, 19] introduces several forms of relevance, which can be used to characterize what "tells about" means. We show how these forms of relevance are strongly related to conditional independence. We also complete the results given in [19] , by exhibiting the computational complexity of each form of relevance introduced in [19] .
Lakemeyer's notion of irrelevance of a formula to a subject matter (Definition 9 in [19] ) is studied in [20, 21] (where it is related to formula-variable independence).
Strict relevance of a formula to a subject matter
Lakemeyer has introduced two forms of strict relevance. The first (chronologically) one has been given in [18] , as follows. [18] ). Let Σ be a formula from PROP PS and V a subset of PS. Σ is strictly relevant to V if and only if every prime implicate of Σ contains a variable from V .
Definition 8 (strict relevance to a subject matter
Lakemeyer has also introduced another notion of strict relevance [19] , more demanding than the original one. Here we consider an equivalent definition. Definition 9 (strict relevance to a subject matter [19] ). Let Σ be a formula from PROP PS and V a subset of PS. Σ is strictly relevant to V if and only if there exists a prime implicate of Σ mentioning a variable from V , and every prime implicate of Σ mentions only variables from V .
Both definitions prevent tautologies and contradictory formulas from being strictly relevant to any set of variables. The basic difference between these two definitions is that, in the first one, we want that every prime implicate of Σ contains at least a variable from V , while in the second case we impose that every prime implicate of Σ must contain only variables from V . 1 As the following example shows, there are formulas for which the two definitions of strict relevance do not coincide. Σ = (a ∨ b) and V = {a}. There is only one prime implicate of Σ, namely a ∨ b. Since it contains at least a variable of V , it follows that Σ is strictly relevant to V with respect to [18] . However, since the prime implicate a ∨ b is not composed only of variables of V (because b / ∈ V ), it follows that Σ is not strictly relevant to V with respect to [19] .
Example 2. Let
Through formula-variable independence, we can derive an alternative characterization of the notion of strict relevance introduced by Lakemeyer in [19] . Indeed, as a straightforward consequence of the definition, we have that Σ is strictly relevant to V if and only if Σ is V-dependent on V and V-independent from Var(Σ) \ V (see [20] ).
We have identified the complexity of both definitions of strict relevance, and they turn out to be different, as the first definition is easier than the second one. Namely, STRICT RELEVANCE OF A FORMULA TO A SUBJECT MATTER [19] is BH 2 -complete [20] while we have the following: Proposition 13 (complexity of strict relevance as in [18] 
Proof.
• Membership. Let us consider the complementary problem. Guess a clause δ, check that it does not contain any variable from V (this can be achieved in time polynomial in |δ| + |V |, hence in time polynomial in |Σ| + |V | since no prime implicate of Σ can include a variable that does not occur in Σ). Then check that it is an implicate of Σ (one call to an NP-oracle) and check that every subclause of δ obtained by removing from it one of its k literals is not an implicate of Σ (k calls to an NP-oracle). Since only k + 1 calls to such an oracle are required to check that δ is a prime implicate of Σ, the complementary problem of STRICT RELEVANCE belongs to • Hardness by polynomial reduction from 2-QBF: we have that ∀A∃BΣ (A, B) is valid if and only if every prime implicate of Σ that contains a variable from A also contains a variable from B (see [12] , Proposition 1), i.e., if and only if every prime implicate of Σ contains a variable from B (since Var(Σ) = A ∪ B), i.e., if and only if Σ is strictly relevant to B. ✷
Explanatory relevance
Lakemeyer [19] also introduces a notion of relevance of a formula Φ to a subject matter V with respect to a formula Σ that can be abductively characterized (see Definition 20 in [19] ):
Definition 10 (explanatory relevance). Let Σ and Φ be formulas from PROP PS and V a subset of PS. Φ is (explanatory) relevant to V with respect to Σ if and only if there exists a minimal abductive explanation for Φ with respect to Σ that mentions a variable from V . The next result shows that explanatory relevance can be rewritten using strong conditional independence: 
Proposition 14. Φ is explanatory relevant to V with respect to Σ if and only if new ≈ ceteris paribus
Σ∧(Φ⇒new) V where new ∈ PS \ (V ∪ Var(Σ)) is a new variable.
Proof. (⇒) Assume that Φ is explanatory relevant to V with respect to
, Σ ∧ ¬new ∧ ¬Φ |= δ; subsequently, we get Σ ∧ ¬Φ |= δ, i.e., Σ ∧ ¬δ |= Φ, which means that ¬δ is an explanation for Φ with respect to Σ mentioning a variable from V ; its minimality comes from the abovementioned minimality of δ . ✷ This result is helpful for studying the complexity of this form of relevance.
Proposition 15 (complexity of explanatory relevance). EXPLANATORY RELEVANCE is
Proof. Membership is a direct consequence of the above result together with Proposition 10. Its p 2 -hardness is a direct consequence of Theorem 4.2.1 from [11] (that establishes the p 2 -completeness of the problem of checking whether an individual hypothesis is relevant for minimally explaining Φ with respect to Σ, i.e., belongs to at least one of its minimal abductive explanations). ✷
Relevance between two subject matters relative to a knowledge base
Lakemeyer [19] also introduces a notion of relevance between two subject matters relative to a knowledge base. Proof. Trivial from the fact that two subject matters are relevant with respect to a knowledge base if and only if they are not ceteris paribus strongly independent, and checking this form of strong independence is p 2 -complete. ✷
Novelty
Novelty is a form of relevance between two formulas given some background knowledge. Introduced in [14] , this notion has been analyzed in more details in the propositional case in [26] . Closely related to Lakemeyer's relevance (see [19] ), it can be used to define information filtering policies and cooperative answering techniques [13] . Definition 12 (novelty). Let Σ, Φ and Ψ be formulas from PROP PS . Φ is new to Ψ with respect to Σ if and only if there is a minimal abductive explanation for Ψ with respect to Σ ∧ Φ that is not a minimal abductive explanation for Ψ with respect to Σ, or there is a minimal abductive explanation for ¬Ψ with respect to Σ ∧ Φ that is not a minimal abductive explanation for ¬Ψ with respect to Σ.
Intuitively, Φ is new to Ψ with respect to Σ if and only if expanding Σ with Φ gives rise to new contexts in which the semantics of Ψ is determined (as true or false). ⇒ b) , and Ψ = c. Φ is new to Ψ with respect to Σ since γ = a is a minimal explanation for Ψ with respect to Σ ∧ Φ, but not a minimal explanation for Ψ with respect to Σ. Thus, in the context where a is interpreted as true, expanding Σ with Φ enables deriving the truth value of Ψ , while it remains undetermined when Φ is not taken into account.
More refined notions of novelty have been pointed out in [26] , by considering separately Ψ and ¬Ψ .
Definition 13 (positive novelty, negative novelty). Let Σ, Φ and Ψ be formulas from PROP PS .
• Φ is new positive to Ψ with respect to Σ if and only if there is a minimal abductive explanation for Ψ with respect to Σ ∧ Φ that is not a minimal abductive explanation for Ψ with respect to Σ.
• Φ is new negative to Ψ with respect to Σ if and only if there is a minimal abductive explanation for ¬Ψ with respect to Σ ∧ Φ that is not a minimal abductive explanation for ¬Ψ with respect to Σ.
Thus, Φ is new to Ψ with respect to Σ if and only if Φ is new positive to Ψ or Φ is new negative to ¬Ψ . This simple result, as well as many characterization results for novelties, can be found in [26] . Especially, it is easy to see that Φ is new negative to Ψ with respect to Σ if and only if Φ is new positive to ¬Ψ with respect to Σ. Among the results given in [26] also is a prime implicate characterization of positive novelty and negative novelty: 
Proof.
• Positive novelty. By definition, Φ is new positive to Ψ with respect to Σ if and only if there is a minimal abductive explanation for Ψ with respect to Σ ∧ Φ that is not a minimal abductive explanation for Ψ with respect to Σ. This is equivalent to state that there exists a clause π for which the following three conditions hold.
What is left to prove is that the first two conditions implies π / ∈ PI(Σ). Indeed, the first one implies that Σ ∧ Φ ∧ ¬Ψ |= π , while the second one is equivalent to:
Let us assume that the first condition holds. Then, Σ |= π and thus π cannot be a prime implicate of Σ. If the second condition holds, then π is also an implicate of Σ ∧ Φ ∧ ¬Ψ : as a result, π cannot be a prime implicate of that formula.
• Negative novelty. Immediate from the fact that Φ is new negative to Ψ with respect to Σ if and only if Φ is new positive to ¬Ψ with respect to Σ, and the fact that the proposition holds for positive novelty. ✷ From this proposition, it is easy to prove that focusing on prime implicates is unnecessary (implicates are sufficient): As an immediate consequence, considering minimal abductive explanations in the definitions above is useless (considering abductive explanations is sufficient).
We are now making precise the relationship between the various forms of novelty and strong conditional independence. Interestingly, it has been shown in [27] that this form of independence characterizes exactly the formulas that are preserved under change in Winslett's Possible Models Approach to update.
Proposition 19. Let Σ, Φ and Ψ be propositional formulas, and let v Φ and v Ψ be two new propositional variables (not appearing in Φ, Ψ and Σ), and let
We have derived the following complexity results for novelty:
Proposition 20 (complexity of novelty In order to minimize our efforts, we first prove that novelty-based independence is 
it is obvious that Φ 1 ∧ Ψ 1 and Φ 2 ∧ Ψ 2 are novelty-based independent. As a consequence, since
If Φ 1 and Ψ 1 are novelty-based independent and Φ 2 and Ψ 2 are novelty-based independent, this implies that Φ 1 |= γ holds or Ψ 1 |= γ holds or Φ 2 |= γ holds or Ψ 2 |= γ holds. This contradicts the fact that Φ 1 ∧ Φ 2 |= γ holds and Ψ 1 ∧ Ψ 2 |= γ holds.
(⇐) Assume that Φ 1 and Ψ 1 are not novelty-based independent (the remaining case where Φ 2 and Ψ 2 would not be novelty-based independent is similar). Then, there exists a prime implicate π of Φ 1 ∧ Ψ 1 that is neither a prime implicate of Φ 1 nor a prime implicate of Ψ 1 . Clearly enough,
this is also equivalent to saying that Φ 1 |= π holds or Ψ 1 |= π holds or Φ 2 |= π holds or Ψ 2 |= π holds. We have assumed that π neither is a prime implicate of Φ 1 nor a prime implicate of Ψ 1 . Actually, we can prove that π neither is an implicate of Φ 1 nor an implicate of Ψ 1 . Indeed, if π were an implicate of Φ 1 (respectively Ψ 1 ), a prime implicate π of Φ 1 (respectively Ψ 1 ) would exist s.t. π |= π holds. Since Φ 1 ∧ Ψ 1 |= Φ 1 (respectively Ψ 1 ) holds, there exists a prime implicate π of Φ 1 ∧ Ψ 1 s.t. π |= π holds. This implies that π |= π holds and since π and π are prime implicates of the same formula, we have π ≡ π . Hence, π ≡ π holds as well. This would contradict the fact that π is not a prime implicate of Φ 1 (respectively Ψ 1 ). Now, since π neither is an implicate of Φ 1 nor an implicate of Ψ 1 , it must be the case that Φ 2 |= π holds or Ψ 2 |= π holds. Since Φ 1 |= π holds, we know that π is not a tautology. Because π is a prime implicate of Φ 1 ∧ Ψ 1 , it must be the case that • Let x, y be two variables from PS and Σ a formula from PROP PS . Then x and y are ceteris paribus strongly independent with respect to Σ if and only if for every term γ over Var(Σ) \ {x, y}, the four following statements are true:
• x ∧ y ∧ Σ ∧ γ is satisfiable if and only if x ∧ Σ ∧ γ is satisfiable and y ∧ Σ ∧ γ is satisfiable.
• ¬x ∧ y ∧ Σ ∧ γ is satisfiable if and only if ¬x ∧ Σ ∧ γ is satisfiable and y ∧ Σ ∧ γ is satisfiable.
• x ∧ ¬y ∧ Σ ∧ γ is satisfiable if and only if x ∧ Σ ∧ γ is satisfiable and ¬y ∧ Σ ∧ γ is satisfiable.
• ¬x ∧ ¬y ∧ Σ ∧ γ is satisfiable if and only if ¬x ∧ Σ ∧ γ is satisfiable and ¬y ∧ Σ ∧ γ is satisfiable. This is equivalent to saying that for every clause δ over Var(Σ) \ {x, y}, the four following statements are true:
• x ∧ y ∧ Σ |= δ if and only if x ∧ Σ |= δ or y ∧ Σ |= δ.
• ¬x ∧ y ∧ Σ |= δ if and only if ¬x ∧ Σ |= δ or y ∧ Σ |= δ.
• x ∧ ¬y ∧ Σ |= δ if and only if x ∧ Σ |= δ or ¬y ∧ Σ |= δ.
• ¬x ∧ ¬y ∧ Σ |= δ if and only if ¬x ∧ Σ |= δ or ¬y ∧ Σ |= δ.
Clearly enough, if the four statements above are satisfied for every clause, they are also satisfied for the clauses that do not contain x or y as a variable. Conversely, let us show that if x and y are ceteris paribus strongly independent, then the four statements above are satisfied by every clause δ. Let us now consider a clause δ s.t. Var(δ) ∩ {x, y} = ∅ and δ is not a tautology (tautologies trivially satisfy the four statements above). For simplicity, assume that the variable x occurs positively in δ. Then, it is clear that the first and the third statements above are satisfied by such clauses δ. For the remaining cases (second and fourth statements), let δ be the clause obtained by removing every occurrence of x in δ. We have ¬x ∧ y ∧ Σ |= δ if and only if ¬x ∧ y ∧ Σ |= δ . If δ contains y as a positive literal, then ¬x ∧ y ∧ Σ |= δ and y ∧ Σ |= δ holds as well. Hence, y ∧ Σ |= δ also holds. This shows that the second statement is satisfied by δ. Otherwise, let δ be the clause obtained by removing every occurrence of ¬y in δ . We have ¬x ∧ y ∧ Σ |= δ if and only if ¬x ∧ y ∧ Σ |= δ . Because δ does not contain any occurrence of x or y, if x and y are ceteris paribus strongly independent, then it must be the case that if ¬x ∧ y ∧ Σ |= δ holds, then ¬x ∧ Σ |= δ holds or y ∧ Σ |= δ holds. This implies that ¬x ∧ Σ |= δ holds or y ∧ Σ |= δ holds, hence the second statement is satisfied. The remaining cases, i.e., δ contains a negative occurrence of x, δ contains a positive occurrence of y, δ contains a negative occurrence of y, can be handled in a similar way, mutatis mutandis (clearly, both x and y and x and ¬x play symmetric roles with respect to the conjunction of the four statements). Thus, x and y are ceteris paribus strongly independent with respect to Σ if and only if:
• Σ ∧ x and Σ ∧ y are novelty-based independent, and • Σ ∧ ¬x and Σ ∧ y are novelty-based independent, and • Σ ∧ x and Σ ∧ ¬y are novelty-based independent, and • Σ ∧ ¬x and Σ ∧ ¬y are novelty-based independent.
• Several instances of novelty-based independence can be gathered into a single one in polynomial time through renaming as long as all the formulas that are considered are satisfiable. This is stated formally by Lemma 11.
As a consequence of Lemma 11, we can state that x and y are ceteris paribus strongly independent with respect to Σ iff rename 1 4 (Σ ∧ ¬y) are novelty-based independent, provided that Σ |= x holds, Σ |= ¬x holds, Σ |= y holds, and Σ |= ¬y holds. This equivalence is obtained by applying three times the lemma above; each rename i (i ∈ 1, . . . , 4) is a renaming, i.e., a substitution from variables to variables s.t. rename i (x) = x i , that is extended to formulas in an obvious compositional way; clearly enough, renaming a formula preserves its satisfiability.
• The next observation is that in the proof of p 2 -hardness of ceteris paribus strong conditional independence of single variables given above (Lemma 10), we can assume that Σ |= x holds, Σ |= ¬x holds, Σ |= y holds, and Σ |= ¬y holds without loss of generality as soon as the matrix Φ of the 2-QBF formula ∀A∃BΦ [A, B] •
Indeed, if it were not the case, we should have γ ∧ ¬Ψ |= new. Since new does not occur in γ ∧ ¬Ψ , it should be the case that γ ∧ ¬Ψ is unsatisfiable, which contradicts (3). • (1) is equivalent to saying that Φ ∧ γ ∧ ¬Ψ ∧ ¬new is unsatisfiable. When (3) is satisfied, it must be the case that γ |= new. Since new does not occur neither in Φ nor in Ψ , (1) is equivalent to saying that Φ ∧ γ ∧ ¬Ψ is unsatisfiable, i.e., Φ ∧ γ |= Ψ holds.
• (2) implies that Φ ∧ γ is satisfiable.
• (3) is equivalent to saying that γ ∧ (¬Ψ ∨ new) ∧ ¬new is satisfiable. This is equivalent to saying that γ ∧ ¬Ψ ∧ ¬new is satisfiable. As a consequence, γ ∧ ¬Ψ must be satisfiable, i.e., γ |= Ψ holds.
Thus, γ is a certificate showing Φ new positive to Ψ with respect to true, and this completes the proof. ✷
Separability
Levesque [23] introduces a notion of formula separability that proves helpful for the purpose of characterizing queries that can be soundly answered, using an efficient (but incomplete in the general case) evaluation-based inference engine. In the propositional case, separability can be defined as follows: valid and Φ 1 , . . . , Φ n are Σ-separable, they are said to be separable for simplicity. Determining Σ-separable formulas can prove valuable for query answering in a computational perspective. To be more precise, while the complexity of query answering from a set of Σ-separable formulas remains coNP-complete, it is often advantageous from the practical side to replace one large instance of the query answering problem by a linear number of smaller instances. This is what Σ-separability enables to do.
Interestingly, the background information Σ can be incorporated into the formulas checked for separability, so that Σ-separability can always be mapped to separability. 
Proof. Trivial. ✷
This proposition also shows that Σ-separability and separability have the same complexity in the sense that each of them can be polynomially many-one reduced to the other.
As a direct consequence of Corollary 1, in the case where n = 2, separability coincides with novelty-based independence: As a consequence, the complexity of separability and Σ-separability can be easily established:
Proposition 22 (complexity of (Σ-)separability). Σ-SEPARABILITY and SEPARABILITY are p 2 -complete.
Proof. It is sufficient to consider the separability situation (i.e., Σ is a tautology) since Σ-separability can be polynomially many-one reduced to separability, and vice versa.
• Membership. Consider the following algorithm for the complement problem: guess a clause δ and check that Φ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ Φ n |= δ holds, while, for any i ∈ 1 . . .n, Φ i |= δ does not hold. Clearly enough, the check step of this algorithm can be achieved in time polynomial in the size of the input using an NP-oracle (only n + 1 calls to the oracle are required), and the algorithm returns "yes" if and only if Φ 1 , . . . , Φ n are not separable.
• Hardness. Trivial from the fact that checking novelty-based independence is p 2 -complete, and separability coincides with novelty-based independence in the restricted case where n = 2. ✷
Causal independence
The notion of causal independence in symbolic causal networks has been proposed by Darwiche and Pearl in [9] . The latter transformation being polynomial, all complexity results established in our paper carry on to possibilistic non-interactivity when the input is a stratified knowledge base.
Concluding remarks
This paper is centered on conditional independence and its stronger form (strong conditional independence) that we have introduced. Our main contribution is related to both the "philosophical" position and the "pragmatic" position with respect to irrelevance.
On the one hand, we have investigated structural properties for both forms of independence. Simple conditional independence was known to satisfy all properties of semi-graphoids, but not intersection; the latter is also satisfied by strong conditional independence, while the former ones still hold, which mean that strong conditional independence satisfy the properties of graphoids. These results are synthesized on Table 3 . We have also characterized (simple) conditional independence in probabilistic terms (cf. Proposition 2); this confirms that conditional independence is a good logical counterpart to probabilistic independence, as Darwiche says [8] . From this result, analogous characterizations for strong independence follow.
On the other hand, we have identified the complexity of the various (in)dependence relations considered in this paper, and a number of characterizations have been given as well. In light of the results established, it appears that most (in)dependence relations have a high complexity. The three forms of conditional independence (and the notions connected to them) are in complexity classes located at the second level of the polynomial hierarchy. This is not so surprising since this is where a large part (if not the majority) of important problems in knowledge representation 2 is located.
According to Darwiche [8] , conditional independence can be useful for improving many forms of inference, including satisfiability, entailment, abduction and diagnosis. In optimal cases, for example, a satisfiability problem can be decomposed into a small number of satisfiability problems on easier knowledge bases (with less variables). We have also briefly mentioned how conditional independence can prove valuable in the context of reasoning about actions. For all these applications, the computational value of conditional independence lies in the fact that a global computation can be (soundly) decomposed into a number of local computations (which can be performed efficiently), whenever some independence relations are satisfied. Similar ideas have been developed in [2, 17] .
The complexity results given in this paper show that it is not always a good idea to search in an intensive way for independence relations as a preliminary step to inference. Especially, it may be paradoxical (and sometimes dangerous) to preliminarily compute a p 2 -hard independence relation to help solving a NP-or coNP-complete problem (given that the input sizes of both problems are polynomially related). Fortunately, this negative comment has only a general scope (worst case complexity results have been considered), and for many instances, taking advantage of (ir)relevance information can prove quite efficient. Indeed, from the practical side, our complexity results show only that the exploitation of relevance information to improve inference must be done in a careful way. A way to escape from intractability consists in assuming a representation of the knowledge base from which some independence relations can be obtained "for free", or at least in an efficient way. This is what Darwiche achieves with the notion of structured database. While it is not the case that every propositional knowledge base satisfies the locality and modularity conditions of a structured database (see [8] for details), several independence relations can be directly read off from a structured database, and some other ones can be inferred efficiently thanks to the notion of d-separation. As Darwiche states in [8] , it is not the case that all the conditional independence relations with respect to a structured database can be found this way. In some sense, our complexity results confirm that focusing on some independence relations, easy to be found, is the good way to do. The same conclusion can be drawn for relevance relations used to characterize what "tells about" means.
Last but not least, our paper shows how closely many independence relations pointed out so far in the literature are related to conditional independence. Thus, strong conditional independence, stronger than Darwiche and Pearl's conditional independence, can easily be rewritten using the latter notion (Proposition 3). Formula-variable independence can be viewed as a special case of strong conditional independence (Proposition 12). Simple and strong conditional independence coincide on marginal independence. At the other Fig. 1 . Connections between (in)dependence relations. extreme, strong ceteris paribus independence is a particularly interesting notion which is equivalent to Lakemeyer's irrelevance between subject matters (Proposition 16). The three notions of novelty are special cases of strong ceteris paribus dependence (Proposition 19) and novelty-based independence is a special case of strong ceteris paribus independence, which proves to be a special case of Levesque's separability (both coincide for the case of two formulas, see Proposition 21) . Finally, there is also a close link between conditional independence and non-interactivity. A synthetic description of the relationships between various definitions is depicted on Fig. 1 .
We think that pointing out such close connections is important because (1) babelism is always a bad thing, and (2) known results may appear synergetic. Thus, it is possible to take advantage of results about conditional independence to achieve a better understanding of the other forms of independence considered in this paper. Specifically, we have been able to identify their computational complexity knowing the complexity of conditional independence. Similar synergetic roles can emerge for other concerns, including algorithms and applications. Thus, though the practical computation of many of the independence relations considered in this paper has not been investigated in depth, our results show that it is possible to benefit from Darwiche's computational framework for conditional independence, at least as a starting point.
This work also opens several ways for further research. Especially, it would be interesting to know how the connections between logical conditional independence and conditional independence in ordinal uncertainty calculi could be transposed to the notions of utility independence and preferential independence, as defined in multicriteria decision making and studied from a knowledge representation perspective by Bacchus and Grove [3] .
